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Abstract 
The paper analyzes two points: 
possible link between the distribution of information among citizens and the size of the bureaucratic 
activity.
bureaucratic goods/services and using the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) theory, the paper shows that a greater 
dispersion of information can decrease the size of bureaucracy. 
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1. Introduction 
The effects of free media have been extensively considered by the economic literature. The basic framework is 
the traditional theory of the communication pointing out the positive role of the mass media to disseminate the 
information. 
While the role of media as a vehicle of information is a recognized idea, there is not a univocal point of view 
about the conditions under which media should provide information. 
-controlled media are desirable because 
information is a public good and the provision and the diffusion of information is subject to relevant fixed costs, 
decreasing average costs and marginal costs smaller than average costs. Both elements determine market failure: 
information is not excludable and the production technology is such that media industry becomes a natural 
monopoly. On these motivations were based the thesis of the British Broadcasting Corporation  to maintain a public 
monopoly on radio and television in Britain (Coase 1974). 
provides more and differentiate information making the agents able to better understand their preferences about 
economic, social and political issues. This approach is in part correlated to the more general public choice theory 
asserting that when media are state controlled, politicians can use their power to manipulate and distort information 
to their advantage (Besley & Burgess 2002; Djankov et al.2003; Coyne & Leeson 2004, 2005, 2009 a). 
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Although the public interest theory can be theoretically sharable, institutional and empirical studies validate the 
liberal theory as well as the public choice theory. 
This paper focuses on the possible effects of 
 
As known, & 74) 
analyzes the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats as a principal-agent relationship characterized by three 
political demand function; b) bureaucrats maximize their private utility pursuing non pecuniary goals -as power and 
prestige- correlated to the size of the bureau; c) the distribution of information between politicians and bureaucrats is 
such that the political demand- that is the maximum the government is willing to pay for any amount of output- is 
known to the bureaucrats but the bureaucracy is not required to reveal a complete production cost function. 
As a consequence, the informative advantage of bureaucrats gives to them a real decisional authority (Aghion 
&Tirole 1997) with a final outcome characterized by a bureaucratic output greater than the social efficient quantity. 
Even if the following literature has partially modified this framework looking for institutional mechanisms 
improving bureaucratic efficiency (Breton & Wintrobe 1975, 1982; Breton 1998;  McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; 
Miller & Moe 1983; Tirole 1986, 1994), the basic idea of a given and known demand for bureaucratic output is 
assumed with little attention on the elements affecting it. 
information about that goods/services. 
 
Nevertheless, they can not be considered a neutral tool for the diffusion of news, given that, provided information 
often reflect the preferences of editors and owners (Besley & Prat 2006; Djankov et al. 
not only to provide more information but differentiated information. 
As a consequence, a plurality of informative sources provides information in a diversified way. Groups of 
citizens receive news and pieces of information according to their info
of information promotes the heterogeneity of ideas and preferences on economic, social and political issues as well 
as hete  
This framework redefines the agency relationship between citizens-principal and bureaucracy-agent. As the 
oods/services is 
characterized by a greater dispersion making harder for bureaucrats to collect and to summarize useful  information 
for their choices. The weakening of bureaucratic informative power can translate in a smaller size of bureaucracy. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a review of the economic literature on the effects of mass media 
evaluation for bureaucratic goods/services, while section 4 points out the effects of the dispersion of information on 
the size of bureaucracy. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Mass media and economic outcomes 
Several studies (Djankov et al. 2003; Coyne & Leeson 2007) show a negative correlation between state 
ownership of media and economic development. Considering the ownership of media (television, radio and 
newspapers) in 97 countries1 with reference to the 1999,  Djankov et al. (2003) show that when the state control of 
media is more concentrated, a poorer social and economic performance realizes, making the empirical analysis 
consistent with the public choice theory. 
Their main results point out that societies with a more pervasive State control of information are characterized by 
a lower levels of political rights, civil liberties, security of property, quality of regulation, higher level of corruption, 
 
1 In particular, the 97 countries considered are: 21 in Africa, 9 in Americas, 17 in Asia-Pacific area, 7 in Central 
Asia and Caucasus, 16 in Central and Eastern Europe, 16 in Western Europe, 11 in the MENA  area (Middle East 
and North Africa). 
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risk of confiscation as well as lower life expectancy, greater infant mortality and, in general, worst health conditions 
(Djankov et al. 2003).  
The basic idea- confirmed by data- is that the agents are not aware of their rights and their alternative 
opportunities when the institutional setting is not characterized by a plurality of informative channels providing 
more and differentiated information. 
Coyne and Leeson (2007) basically draw the same conclusions from a political economy perspective. Analyzing 
the specific case concerning the use of foreign aids by politicians in 26 post-socialist countries, they show that 
countries whit independent media realize better economic outcomes (in term of GDP) because politicians are more 
accountable in the use of  public resources and more interested to promote the general welfare. 
In general terms, mass media is considered as a powerful instrument to improve the agency relationship between 
politicians (agent) and citizens (principal). Stromberg (2001) identifies three main missions of media to improve the 
political process: a) mass media influence political competition because it is the channel through which politicians 
convey campaign promises to a forward-looking electorate; b) mass media informs backward-looking voters about 
government actions which are not directly observable such as budget deficits, or about who is responsible for cuts 
or increases in expenditure programs; c) mass media can influence the weight voters put on different issues in their 
voting choice. (Stromberg 2001  p. 653). 
In this perspective, mass media decreases the informative gap between political agent and principal and improve 
the political accountability.  
Analyzing  data from 16 Indian states for the period 1958-1992, Besley and Burgess (2001) find that more 
- in term of foodgrains per capita distributed by the public distribution 
system- are those with high levels of electoral turnout, literacy and newspapers circulation. Since in India 
newspapers represent the only mass media not controlled by the State, results are conceptually consistent with the 
liberal theory of media2. 
From a similar point of view, Leeson (2008) analyzes more recent survey data3  showing a positive correlation 
individuals less informed about the basic political issues and less politically involved, are also characterized by low 
levels of political accountability leading to a lower development. 
economic performance, other studies investigate the necessary conditions to consider media really independent from 
the political power. 
State control of mass media can take place through several channels: direct ownership, financial pressure, 
structure of media industry. When the State funds mass media or poses some kind of constraints to the mass media 
sector (barriers to entry, constraints on the wave bands or State ownership of media infrastructures such as the 
distribut
Leeson 2004; 2005). 
In this perspective Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011) finds a negative correlation between the newspapers front 
coverage of governm
the newspapers confirming that the State financial pressure affects the provision of information by media. 
Nevertheless, private ownership of media does not assure- per se- the effectiveness of media as an instrument 
increasing the political accountability or the economic performance of a country. An effective competitive private 
media sector seems to be a desirable condition. 
Where private ownership of media is concentrated, it is perceptible that information provided is rather flat and it 
 
 
2 Besley and Burgess (2001, p. 635) point out that for the period 1958-1992 television and radio were under state 
control, while newspapers represented a mass media independent from the State (only the 2% of newspapers were 
owned by central and local governments). 
3 The empirical analysis of Leeson (2008) concerns survey data 2003 on 12,000 citizens  in nine EU candidate 
countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey). 
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A more large number of media firms belonging to different owners can be a necessary condition to have the 
information reflecting different points of view and giving to the citizens the instruments to assess in a critical way 
economic and political issues. The analysis of Snyder and Stromberg (2010) moves in this perspective. They find 
that more accountable politicians characterize countries with more media coverage. Testing with empirical analysis 
the impact of press coverage on citizens knowledge and political actions in the US congressional districts, they show 
that  voters living in areas with less coverage- i.e. less sources of information-  for their US House representative are 
less able to describe their representatives, the implemented policies and, consequently, to rate the politicians.  
Nevertheless, the effective competition in the information market can not be totally independent by some kind of 
public intervention. The State can have an active role not only removing barriers to entry but also supporting media 
firms to assure a plurality of information providers in the market. The impact of the State interventions should be 
assessed in comparative terms valuating the costs due to a potential smaller State independence of media and the 
benefits in terms of a greater competition on the information market.  
Finally, free media -as above specified- is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for positive economic 
performance. 
The legal framework- defined by the State- as well as the quality of the media (in term of efficient training of the 
 On this point the case of Bulgaria is illuminating. In this 
country a free media industry has not been sufficient to have a positive result in terms of economic development 
entertainment rather than political and economic issues has allowed politicians 
(2004, p.40). 
Previous conditions - joint to the State independent condition- are necessary to promote the coordination of 
conjectures on economic policies leading to positive economic and political outcomes. 
3. evaluations 
In more general terms, media introduces individuals to new ideas, meanings and alternatives changing 
 models and making the agents more aware of their preferences about different issues. 
This point is a particularly relevant point for goods and services provided by the public sector. While for private 
goods, market competition is a tool to collect information through comparative evaluations; for goods or services 
procedure for many reasons. 
Many benefits are external benefits. In other cases benefits are contingent on some events or they will be 
perceived only in a future time. For example, a green area gives positive benefits not only to the inhabitants using 
directly the park , but also a broader community in terms of clear air, lower traffic density, etc. Benefits coming 
from others goods/services, such as cultural and health services have a direct component strongly perceived by some 
agents (as families with children or individuals needing health care) and also an external component concerning all 
people4. 
Some agents could not fully perceive the external benefit of the good/service. 
Other agents could perceive, at the present time, only the external benefits but they will perceive in a future time 
the direct benefits too, because they will be in a different condition. 
Individuals can be aware of their preferences for this kind of goods only with a detailed and differentiated 
information about the characteristics of the good as well as about the direct, external and potential future benefits5. 
All in all, each agent takes decisions and makes choices based on own personal idea stemming from the 
combination of available information, subjective elaboration of that information and subjective tastes (Antonelli, 
2009). 
 
4 A higher cultural level of collectivity and/or better collective health conditions are social welfare improving. 
5 The misperception of external and future benefits can also depend from a myopic behavior of some agents. In our 
framework this different subjective attitude of the agents can be caught by the subjective elaboration of available 
information. 
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geneity because agents receive news 
on some problems analyzed with different points of views. 
The issue that different media sources provide information in a differentiate way is widely known in economics. 
For example Djankov et al. (2003) sustain that news are provided reflecting the preferences of editors and 
owners, while Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) claim that the differentiation of information can be generated from 
the demand side. 
Starting from the idea that readers hold biased beliefs stemming from their general knowledge and education, 
from previous news, from political ideology enhanced by political competition, they assume that readers prefer read 
news consistent with their beliefs. As a consequence, the newspapers or, in general, mass media, can slant the 
presentation of the news in order to match the preferences of their audiences. Each newspaper selects and stress only 
some details of the information to cater to the preferences of its audience, thus preserving and, sometimes, 
increasing the heterogeneity of the community. 
Each agent will elaborate its information focusing the attention on some particular points which mainly interests 
himself. 
er 
heterogeneity within the community. 
4. Dispersion of information and the size of bureaucracy 
heterogeneity within a community which translates in h  
As competition in media sector increases, a greater informative differentiation realizes or, in other words, a 
greater dispersion of information can characterize the economic system. 
In general economic efficiency is not correlated to sprinkled information. On the contrary, economic efficiency 
requires coordination and perfect information by every economic agents. Market institutions can be useful to this 
the profit and the loss signals sent to the participants in the market 
process lead to learning and the spread of information  
Nevertheless, the equilibria in non market institutional settings are not regulated by price mechanism but by 
political and bureaucratic decisions. 
In the case of public bureaucracy, it is well known that bureaucrats take decisions having information on two 
 for bureaucratic output. 
While the first element comes from inside bureaucracy, the second one is available summarizing the information 
coming from outside bureaucracy. 
Traditional public choice literature does not much investigate this second point, but two cases are possible. 
The first one considers citizens as identical agents and the aggregate demand is simply the sum of identical 
monopolistic power of bureaucrats since it is easier for them to collect and to summarize information. Public choice 
theory implicitly adopts this assumption. 
The second idea-proposed in this paper-is that citizens are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity means that there is a 
distribution of demand functions for bureaucratic output. Since the bureaucratic decision maker can only decide 
considering an average demand, the available information has to be summarized. A greater heterogeneity makes 
harder to collect information as well as to summarize it. 
 
It is well known that when a distribution is characterized by a greater dispersion of values, the average value of 
that distribution can decrease (Rotschild and Stiglitz 1970). 
average demand can decrease. Since bureaucrats face a lower average demand, they are enforced to decrease the 
bureaucratic output reducing the inefficient over production. 
To show the idea in analytical terms we consider the relationship between a bureaucratic organization- identified 
with a representative bureaucrat- providing a public good/service        G 0;G  and n agents demanding G . 
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Consistently with the conceptual framework of previous sections, we consider that the individual demand for G 
also depends by the available information (i)  represented by a random variable. Consequently, individual demand 
becomes sthocastic given that i induces a probability distribution on it. 
Let p(G;Dj ) the parametric density function  where the parameter is G- representing the probability that the 
0,Dj  for a given level of G. The cumulative function P(G; D j ) represents 
the probability that the individual willingness to pay is smaller or equal to D j , for a given G. 
The standard characteristics of the probability functions hold: 
  p(G;Dj )>0 G  ; 
 P(G;Dj ) prob Dj D j G   is the cumulative distribution with P(G;0) 0  and 
P(G;Djmax ) 1. 
 
The individual expected demand 6  is given by: 
E(Dj ) Dj
0
D j
p(G;Dj )dDj
 
while the total demand is: 
 
DTOT
EDj (G,i, p)
j 1
n
 
  
According to the decreasing marginal utility law, the marginal valuations of goods are decreasing. 
Considering information as a good available for individuals, we assume that  individual demand is concave in 
quantity information. This means that, in general, more information implies better decision7 but the marginal effect 
of information on individual evaluations is decreasing (following the decreasing marginal utility law). 
Starting from a given distribution of information among agents characterizing the demand BD, the efficient 
equilibrium realizes in E (fig. 1) where the output level is G0 corresponding to the equality between demand (BD) 
and supply (AC). 
proving the output G1 where total costs (OACG1) are equal to total benefits (OBDG1). 
 
 
6 The characteristics sub a) and b) of probability functions assure a regular demand function. 
 
7 As the information increases, the demand for a given good can increase or decrease (this is irrelevant to the 
purpose of the analysis) according to the individual tastes for the good as well as the subjective elaboration of 
information. 
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Fig. 1 Bureaucratic equilibrium
Assume now that exogenous factors such as an increase of informative sources, produces a greater dispersion of 
p and p~ are two density functions
where p~ is obtained from p by taking some of the probability weight from the center of p and adding it to each tail
of p in such a way as to leave the mean unchanged. In other words, p~ is obtained from a mean-preserving spread 
on p. 
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), it is known that under the concavity assumption of jD , the sum of the 
subjective demand functions will decrease in response to a mean-preserving spread on the information distribution,
that is
n
j
n
j
jj piGEDpiGED
1 1
)~,,(),,(
A gap between the two demand functions realizes. As the dispersion of citizens' information increases,
bureaucrats face with a lower expected demand for their output (B'G1). Since the bureaucracy is rewarded with a 
budget reflecting citizens' demand, the bureaucratic equilibrium is clearing for a smaller quantity (G2) and the 
put is reduced (Antonelli, 2009).
5. Concluding remarks
In modern soc
information and its distribution. When the media sector is characterized by an effective competition, information can
be distributed in a differentiate way because, as the economic literature points out, each media source provides news
reflecting the preferences of editors, owners or some political party.
Information provided in a differentiated way generates a greater heterogeneity of ideas and economic valuations
of goods and services. In this framework, bureaucratic agencies have more heterogeneous informative data about
information. Introducing an informative variable in the demand functions and relying on the Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) result, we show that a greater dispersion of information can be an enforcement mechanism for a smaller size
of bureaucracy.
So in this framework, a smaller size of bureaucratic activity does not derive by a different logic of bureaucratic 
conduct, but by the different institutional context where the bureaucratic decision making process takes place.
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